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BOOK REVIEW
SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL MAN-

DATE IN DispuTE. By Solomon Slonim. Baltimore and London:

The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. xix, 409 (including Appendices, Bibliography, and Index). $13.50.
In 1922 the redoubtable South African soldier-statesman Jan Christiaan
Smuts remarked that, as a result of the League of Nations approval given to his
Union's mandate over the former German territory of South West Africa, the
relations between Mandatory and mandated Territory amounted to

"...

annexa-

tion in all but name."' It was this final qualification which has afforded the
United Nations its most intransigent dispute which is still effectively unresolved
more than half a century after Smuts made this triumphant assertion.
The diplomatic origins of the mandate system which evolved during the
1919 Paris Peace Conference are as familiar to students of international law and
relations as are the disparate interpretations accorded to the Covenant of the
League of Nations and to the mandate agreements themselves. The various
problems which arose almost immediately upon conclusion of the three types
of mandate arrangements--such as the question of the nationality of inhabitants
of mandated territories of the second ("B") and third ("C") class, one of
which was South West Africa-proved difficult of resolution. Equally difficult,
especially during the operative years of the League of Nations, was the question
of where ultimate sovereignty over the mandated areas lay. Early in the history
of the mandate system these two problems reached confluence in the case of
Rex v. Christian,' in which an inhabitant of the Territory of South West Africa

under mandate was held to be validly convicted of treason against the State
Mandatory despite the fact that all acts complained of took place entirely within
the Territory. This extension of effective sovereignty by South Africa over the
Territory, only a matter of months after the confirmation of its mandate, marks
the first application of what has since uncompromisingly remained that State's
legal conception of its rights of administration in South West Africa. Solomon
Slonim has chosen not to address such basic, if derivative, problems in his book.
Instead, the reader is offered a review of the jurisprudential and institutional
history of this mandate as it evolved within the several organs of the United
Nations.
The role played by the United States in both the establishment of the mandate provisions in the League Covenant and later in securing the inclusion of
even more elaborate trusteeship terms in the United Nations Charter has often

been overlooked. In this work Dr. Slonim draws attention to the influence of
Woodrow Wilson in influencing the former result but fails to discuss the latter
episode. The author suggests that President Wilson's apprehension in 1919
regarding the prospect of full Japanese sovereignty over the three great archi1
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pelagos of the west central Pacific (the Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines)
was deeply felt. His desire for a mandatory regime over this area, Slonim proposes, necessarily compelled Wilson to bargain for similar application of the mandate system to all other important former German colonies and protectorates so
as to avoid the appearance of acting discriminatorily against Japanese interests.
As a result mandates for Western Samoa, Nauru, New Guinea, and South West
Africa were arranged. This view has much to recommend it, and its policy
ramifications at the 1945 San Francisco Conference on International Organization were not inconsiderable.
Just as the case of Rex v. Christianillustrates the early assertion of sovereign
rights by the Union of South Africa in South West Africa, so too did the incident
out of which that case arose (the notorious Bondelzwarts Affair of 1922) first
test the concept of international accountability of Mandatory States for their
"sacred trusts." A brief account of this odious affair is provided by Dr. Slonim,
who considers that the discussions which took place in the Permanent Mandates
Commission of the League of Nations after this incident forged the tools of
international mandate supervision. Slonim concludes, quite correctly in this
reviewer's opinion, that the result of the action then taken by the Commissionforcing South Africa to account for its actions before an international bodyset the precedent which, ".

.

. represents the most dramatic and far-reaching

achievement of the whole mandates system." 3
No conflict of consequential nature arose out of South Africa's management
of its mandate prior to 1945. In that year the United Nations Conference on
International Organization produced the Charter of the United Nations containing, inter alia, the terms of the International Trusteeship System. South
Africa became an original Member of the Organization. The Charter provided,
in now well-known part: "The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories
in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship
agreements: a. territories now held under mandate; .... "4
It is today a commonplace to observe that the Charter failed to insist upon
the transformation of all League mandates into United Nations trusteeships.
Less often noted is the reason why this was so. The language of the Charter
was drafted in permissive rather than compulsory terms not because of any
recalcitrant posture adopted by South Africa, but rather as the coincident wish
of the United States of America.
The United States, it will be recalled, was at the time of the San Francisco
Conference still at war with the Japanese Empire. During the course of these
hostilities, the United States had secured belligerent occupation over nearly all
of the Pacific islands held by Japan under League mandate. As a result a domestic struggle had arisen in Washington concerning the post-war status of these
islands. The Departments of State and of the Interior pressed for a policy of
non-annexation, while the Departments of War and of the Navy publicly called
for the islands to be proclaimed formally part of the territories of the United
States. This understandably emotive issue was to a degree later settled by provid3
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ing in Charter Articles 82 and 83 for the establishment of special "strategic"
trusteeship arrangements under the aegis of the Security Council. But, as no
submissions regarding trusteeships were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, and since
indeed the final Charter Articles relating to trusteeship were approved largely
as drafted by the United States Delegation, it is perhaps not surprising in light of
the contemporary domestic debate that the United States did not desire imperative language to be employed in Charter Article 77. Had this been done, it might
well have forced the then new Truman leadership into the position of placing
these islands under trusteeship despite active domestic opposition to such disposition. These circumstances provide a refutation of Dr. Slonim's statement that
the trusteeship provisions of the Charter undoubtedly owed much to the arrival
of newly independent states into the halls of international diplomacy.
In 1945 it remained clear that South Africa had not surrendered its longstanding goal of annexing South West Africa to the Union. During the Conference at San Francisco, the South Africa Delegation actually proposed that
the mandate be terminated and the Territory incorporated into South Africa.'
This incident marks the beginning of the protracted modem struggle for control
of the Territory.
Solomon Slonim's book is largely confined to a consideration of the three
requests by the General Assembly, and one from the Security Council, for Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice on matters relating to
action taken by those bodies with regard to South West Africa.' It is the sole
contentions proceeding before the International Court of Justice in which the
mandate for South West Africa was considered, however, which provides the
central focus of this study." In the greater part of his work, Dr. Slonim treats
with meticulous exposition the inter-relationship of these six judicial pronouncements, carefully summarizing the views of the Court and those of its Judges who
wrote separate statements or issued concurring or dissenting opinions. The
approach adopted by the author is, in the main, broadly one of allowing the
documents, from pleadings and oral argument to Opinions or Judgments, to
speak for themselves. Only infrequently does the author permit his own views
to be drawn into the arena of debate.
After reading Slonim's useful summary of the 1950 Advisory Opinion, one
is confronted with an example of the limitations imposed by his restrictive technique. The author considers in turn each of three bases which have been alternatively suggested by publicists as providing the ratio decidendi adopted by the
5 S. SLONIM, supra note 1, at 348. Of the 50 States which participated in the United
Nations Conference on International Organization, only Syria and Lebanon were newly independent.
6 Id. at 76.
7 Advisory Opinion concerning the International Status of South-West Africa. [1950]
I.C.J. 128; Advisory Opinion concerning Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports
and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67; Advisory
Opinion concerning Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West
Africa, [1956] I.C.J. 23; Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
8 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, [1962] I.C.J. 319; South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J. 6.
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Court in this instance. Dr. Slonim passes judgment himself on none of these
suggestions, nor does he offer any variant of his own. Instead he looks ahead to
the international and institutionally concurrent effects of the Advisory Opinion
in relation to South West Africa. Similarly, the author deals in rapid order with
both the Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedureand that on Oral Petitions.His
documentary research is again comprehensive, if succinctly presented, and he
leaves these cases after brief consideration. No attempt is made to consider the
implications of these cases outside of the South West Africa context.
The factual background against which the contentious jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice was invoked by Ethiopia and Liberia in 1960
against South Africa is well described. All three of these States had been Members of the League of Nations, and jurisdiction was allegedly founded in Article
7 of the South West Africa mandate agreement which provided that "any dispute whatever" arising out of the interpretation or provisions of the mandate between or among League Members would be settled by the Permanent Court of
International justice in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The International Court of Justice in its 1950 Advisory Opinion had held this clause to be
still in force.'
As is well known, in 1962 the Court rejected all of the South African
preliminary objections put forward in this case, concluding in accord with the
1950 Advisory Opinion that the Court enjoyed the competence to entertain the
case on its merits. This phase of the contentious case is dissected with care by
the author and the results set out with lucidity. By way of analysis, however, Dr.
Slonim offers but one sentence as his view of the issues central tothis proceeding:
"In essence, the difference of opinion centered on the applicability of the principle of effectiveness to the relevant instruments and whether jurisdiction of the
Court could be affirmed on this basis alone."" The author does not seek to
acquaint the general reader with this principle, nor does he attempt to demonstrate to the specialist the manner in which the principle was here effectuated.
The discussion of the 1966 South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) forms
the core of Slonim's work. In a particularly well organized section entitled "The
Court Battle: The Metamorphosis of Nuremberg into Brown v. Board of Education," the author attempts to show that the charges against the Court describing its 1966 judgment as unjust, politically grounded, or racially motivated, were
ill-founded, and that criticism should better have been directed at counsel for
the Applicant States of Ethiopia and Liberia. Slonim produces from the 12
volumes of pleadings, oral argument, and other documents generated by this
case, an illuminating synoptical study of the subtle changes in both strategy and
tactics which were introduced by counsel for Applicants during the several years
this case was sub Judice. Dr. Slonim reminds the reader that the Applicants
agreed to accept all averments of fact made by South Africa in reply to the
Memorials and the arguments submitted on behalf of Ethiopia and Liberia. This
decision was made in order to avoid the possibility that the Court might otherwise have accepted a South African proposal that the Court should itself conduct
9
10
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It was this

decision which in retrospect appears to have been crucial.
From this point, Applicants were forced to abandon what Slonim chooses
to call their "Nuremberg" thesis, i.e., that the policy of Apartheid as introduced
into South West Africa operated to the detriment of the inhabitants in violation
of the mandate. Having accepted the "facts" as averred by South Africa, Applicants proceeded to redirect the thrust of their complaint, adverting analogously
to the Brown v. Board of Education 2 rationale. South Africa had contravened
the mandate by introducing the policy of separation, it was argued, and Applicants claimed that this policy was repugnant to customary international law
per se. The author proceeds to demonstrate the measure of ease with which
South Africa was able to successfully refute this charge. Dr. Slonim, revealing
sympathy for the Positivist stance adopted by South Africa, tells us that the
Mandatory was able to parry the Applicants' attack simply by producing oral
evidence which proved to the Court's satisfaction that no norms of "non-discrimination" or of "non-separation" were recognized in customary international
law. The author's choice of this issue as the legal pivot upon which the case
turned is disingenuous as it unfortunately fails to conform with the facts of the
case.
The author himself notes that not even one of the dissentient Judges on the
Court accepted "unqualifiedly" the thesis advanced by Applicants that the alleged norms of non-separation and non-discrimination had crystallized into customary international law through the "consensus" of States. Why then were
any dissenting opinions forthcoming? Simply because the Court did not base its
judgment on the merits of the case as Dr. Slonim urges his readers to infer, but
rather upon the threshold question of jus standi. The South West Africa Cases
were decided by the Court on the basis that: ". . the Applicants cannot be
considered to have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them
in the subject matter of the present claims, and that, accordingly, the Court must
decline to give effect to them.""
The author examines the seven separate dissenting opinions appended to
the 1966 Judgment, and finds that none of them effectively contradicts the rule
posited in the Judgment that the Court possesses an inherent right to decide the
disposition of a case on a basis not advanced by either party. Additionally, Dr.
Slonim finds in the alternative that the South African oral pleadings had implicitly incorporated an objection to the standing of Applicants before the Court.
It is predictable then, given these precursory views, that the author should align
himself against the seven dissenters by denying that the issue of standing should
have been considered to be res judicata on the basis of the 1962 Judgment (by
which the Court rejected preliminary objections to jurisdiction). Dr. Slonim
instead maintains that the 1966 Judgment represents ".... a genuine conclusion
of the argument on the merits."'" Here the author's analysis is comprehensive
11
12
13

14

Id. at 244-245.
387 U.S. 483 (1954).
r1966] I.C.J. 6 at 51.
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and the underlying argument well marshalled. The reader may himself decide
if it is convincing.
In the final sections of his treatise, the author recounts the various Resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council which proclaimed the termination of South Africa's mandate, and considers the resultant 1971 Advisory
Opinion on the effect of these actions. One feels that Dr. Slonim would like
to strike hard at this Advisory Opinion, but he contents himself with somewhat
confusedly criticizing the Court for failing to determine on what basis the General Assembly might validly terminate the mandate, after having earlier admonished the reader to note that the Court was specifically not asked to perform this
task."5
In conclusion, the author's apparent distaste for the 1971 Advisory Opinion
leads him to question the value of attempts to resolve essentially political disputes
by legal means, suggesting that such enterprises are possibly counterproductive.
Dr. Slonim, apparently as the result of this study, also questions the efficacy of
empowering the International Court of Justice both to hear contentious cases
and to issue legal advice to other organs and agencies of its constituent organization. But the same 1971 Advisory Opinion, it will be recalled, not only resolved many issues concerning Namibia (South West Africa), but also decided
two constitutionally important issues relating to interpretation of the Charter
itself.1 It would seem that, given such a record, the Court's dual function may
be more easily defended than attacked.
Solomon Slonim's book, while offering no substantially new factual or
analytical material to scholars, will yet be welcomed by all interested in the development of international law and the maintenance of the international juridical
order. Dr. Slonim's admirable summaries of the copious pleadings, oral arguments, documents, Orders, Advisory Opinions, and Judgments which comprise
only part of the bitter fruit borne by this dispute, are detailed and comprehensive,
clear and easily readable. The author's wide use of primary materials enhances
the value of his work, as does his painstaking documentation of secondary sources.
This book is to be recommended to all who wish a concise source of reference
to the legal and diplomatic history of the South West Africa dispute in the United
Nations.
John H. McNeill*
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Id. at 330, 339, 343.
[1971] I.O.J. 3 at 22, 52-53.
Lecturer in Law, University of Notre Dame London Centre for Legal Studies and
Member of the Pennsylvania Bar: A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D., Villanova University;
LL.M., London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London; Diploma,
The Hague Academy of International Law.
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REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT. By Robert E. Williams, Peter A.
Janus, and Kenneth C. Huhn. Report No. 8 of the "Labor Relations and
Public Policy" series. An effort to discover and set forth the rules, principles, and policies applied by the NLRB in determining whether to certify
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FREEDOM IN A ROCKING BOAT: CHANGING VALUES IN AN UNSTABLE SOCIETY.
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